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Mobile devices have hardware and software components that record large amounts of data. Some of the data is apparent to the 
device owner, some is discarded quickly, and some is hidden from the person using the device. For this study, the researchers 
used an Android smartphone as a typical user, carrying the device throughout the day, using Facebook and Google applications.  
Then the smartphone was analyzed using mobile forensic techniques and software. The investigation revealed security and 
privacy concerns. The researchers were able to retrieve social interactions, pictures, documents, and other personal attributes 
stored on the device. The most interesting find was location tracking information. This Android phone logged and stored 
location data when the researcher had location services enabled, but it also continued to collect and store location information 
after turning location services off. Within Google Maps, the sub-feature called Google Timeline, tracked location, date, and 
time as long as the phone was powered on. These findings will increase awareness for mobile devices users and may lead to 
more consumer-centric privacy settings in mobile operating systems.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In December 2018, Sundar Pichai, Google’s chief executive was called to testify before the U.S. House Judiciary Committee. 
There were three themes that the Judiciary Committee was concerned with, focusing on distrust of large tech firms, specifically 
Google, privacy practices, and concerns about tracking user location (Wakabayashi & Kang, 2018). U.S. Senator Ron Wyden, 
who recently proposed legislation to limit the collection and sale of location data, said “Location information can reveal some 
of the most intimate details of a person’s life — whether you’ve visited a psychiatrist, whether you went to an A.A. meeting, 
who you might date” (Valentino-DeVries, Singer, Keller, & Krolick, 2018). Privacy, data collection, and data utilization has 
garnered more news headlines in the past five years with major stories including Facebook’s Cambridge Analytica scandal, 
passing the General Data Protection Regulation in Europe, and the Equifax breach exposing at least 143 million Americans 
information (Chatillon, 2018).  
For most people in developed countries, smartphones have become vital communications devices to participate in a modern 
life. The smartphones that are within arm’s reach of users for most hours of every day, contain powerful hardware and software 
that can track the activities going on within and near the device. The Androids and iPhones in people’s pocket generate, 
transmit, use, and record, user, system, and application data locally, and in cloud accounts. Location is an important concept 
that could lead to being involved in a criminal case, cause embarrassment, or a myriad of other issues (Schilt, Hong, and 
Gruteser, 2003). People by nature prefer not to be monitored, but to have all the benefits of modern applications (Yerby, 2013). 
The end user of the device is not always able to see or control what the smartphone is doing. Device users have reported being 
averse to installing applications that have access to contacts or tracking location, but numerous Google applications which run 
the devices operating system, phone, and map do not leave the user with much of an alternative (Harris, Brookshire, Patten, 
and Regan, 2015).  
Google’s privacy and data policy details data tracking mechanisms across all of Google’s applications (Google Chrome, Google 
Maps, YouTube, etc.) This policy identifies “things you search for, videos you watch, ads you click or view, your location, 
websites you visit, and apps, browsers, and devices you use to access Google services” (Google Privacy, 2018) as information 
tracked by Google. In addition to this data collection, content created by users (such as e-mails, photos, videos, documents, 
YouTube comments, contacts, calendar events, etc.) are also logged by Google (Google Privacy, 2018). People sign into their 
Google accounts on many devices and then the activity is used to build a profile which details what that person is doing on 
their personal device, work device, or any device where they access Google applications. Each device connection to Google 
services provides Google with a more detailed view into the user’s personal life. This data logging can be used to identify 
gender, ethnicity, employment status and current/previous employer, political affiliation, sexual orientation, etc. and can also 
be used to tailor news and search results to a user’s profile without their consent for content tailoring.  
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Facebook’s privacy policy (revised April 19, 2018) explained data collection methods and how gathered information could be 
utilized. Facebook intentionally makes their policies vague and difficult to pin down. Facebook’s data collection policy outlined 
data tracking of “people, pages, accounts, hashtags, and groups you are connected to and how you interact with them” across 
Facebook products (Facebook, 2018). Device information such as device attributes, device signals, data from device settings, 
and cookie data allow Facebook to obtain device operating system version, battery level, hardware and software version, 
available storage space, Bluetooth signals, nearby wireless access points, GPS location, camera and photo access, and cookie 
data from websites visited on paired devices (Facebook, 2018). Interactions outside of Facebook are gathered through Facebook 
Business Tools. Through this platform, website developers and third-party applications share user data from outside of 
Facebook to Facebook developers. “Profiles” are built for each Facebook user based on this collected data which allow for 
targeted advertisements based on website history, application activity, and GPS location (Facebook, 2018). 
Lessard & Kessler, 2010 declared that 46.3% of global use of mobile devices originated from the United States. This prevalence 
reiterated a need for standardization in collection and analysis tools as an increase in mobile data storage is realized. Researchers 
present methods for obtaining stored mobile device data through enabling USB debugging, rooting the device, examining the 
memory, and recovering the contents using Access Data’s Forensic Tool Kit (FTK) v1.81. The results of their analysis displayed 
all images, documents, plain-text passwords, web searches, a Google Maps database of previous locations, call and text records, 
social media information, e-mail transmissions, etc. (Lessard & Kessler, 2010).  
In 2011, Vidas, Zhang, & Christin presented their findings regarding a uniform methodology for Android device data collection. 
Acknowledging the prevalence of the Android platform and its ability to yield substantial amounts of user data, their research 
identified a standard collection process for data acquisition while preserving data integrity. The author demonstrates a solution 
for best practices while acknowledging manufacturer variances (Vidas, Zhang, & Christin, 2011).  
In 2012, Stirparo & Kounelis presented their findings regarding privacy and security concerns of Android devices. Researchers 
identified target applications, populated data on a test device, acquired test data through digital forensic software, and analyzed 
the collected data results. Digital forensic analysis was conducted which yielded user files, images, location information, 
application credentials, application activity, and other concerning data from tested applications (Stirparo & Kounelis, 2012).  
This study examined suspicions that Google applications collect and store information about the device location. The research 
questions in this study were:  
R1: Do Google applications on an Android mobile device store location information locally on the device? 
R2: Do Google applications on an Android mobile device store location information in the cloud? 
R3: Do Google applications on an Android mobile device record location data when location services are disabled by 
the user? 
R4: Does Facebook track and store interactions within the Android Facebook application? 
 
To answer the research questions, the researchers analyzed stored application data through natively installed, cloud-hosted, and 
social media applications to identify security and privacy issues. The researchers used a Samsung Galaxy Note 5 using the 
Android OS to examine what data existed for Google’s applications (G-Mail, Calendar, Hangout, and Google Timeline.), 
Facebook, and Facebook Messenger. Location services were enabled for a week, to simulate a typical user interaction with the 
device and then disabled for a week. The researchers periodically interacted with Google Maps, Google Calendar, phone, and 
Facebook applications during both phases of the experiment. Following the data collection period, an analysis of the week with 
location services enabled vs. the week with location services disabled were compared. Regardless of whether the location 
settings were set to enabled or disabled, Google Timeline was still actively tracking location. Google Timeline yielded an exact 
location for every moment of every day with timestamps and movement types (walking, driving, etc.). Further analysis with 
Paraben detailed Google Maps links and GPS coordinates for each location tracked through Google Timeline. This research 
details the applications and accounts that recorded information from the Android device used in this study, specifically when 
analyzed using mobile forensics tools.  
METHODOLOGY 
In this study, a Samsung Galaxy Note 5 was prepared by performing a factory reset and then updates. The Android OS version 
was updated to Android 7.0. Google applications, Facebook, and Facebook Messenger were installed and updated. Then USB 
debugging and developer tools were enabled to root the device. The root process was completed utilizing ODIN, SuperSU, 
TWRP recovery, and associated Samsung Galaxy Note 5 drivers and verification through the RootChecker application. The 
device was rooted to gain root access to the physical storage.  Samsung, Google, and Apple have memory, file, and partition 
encryption which means that the device must be rooted or jailbroken before it can be acquired (Magnet Forensics, 2017). 
Without the device rooted, the investigators would have been limited to acquire a logical acquisition or nothing at all. Google 
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Backup and Google Location initially used the default application access of enabled with Google Location later being changed 
to disabled. The device was used for two weeks, as a typical smartphone user would use applications, messaging, and maps.   
Following the initial application setup, a series of controlled tests were conducted. For Google applications, the researcher 
created calendar events, sent and responded to e-mails through G-Mail, sent chat messages through Hangouts, viewed, liked 
and commented on YouTube videos, created and edited documents in Drive, uploaded photos in Drive, browsed Chrome in 
regular browsing mode and in incognito mode. For Facebook, the researcher added friends, created posts, commented on posts, 
shared photos, and links, joined multiple groups, created events on Facebook, joined events, shared location on Facebook, and 
communicated via Facebook Messenger. Several tests followed a pattern such as creating an event in Google Calendar, 
navigating to that event using Google Maps, and then posting about the event on Facebook. Numerous instances of each test 
scenario were created to ensure consistencies in the data findings and establish a “baseline” for standard data patterns.  
After two weeks of using the smartphone, the researchers connected the device to a Windows computer with Paraben Electronic 
Evidence Examiner (E3) installed (Paraben, 2018). The researchers followed the basic process of an investigation including 
response, data gathering or seizure, acquisition, analysis, and reporting (Yerby, Hollifield, Kwak, & Floyd, 2014). Paraben E3, 
previously known as Device Seizure, can reliably acquire logical and physical forensic images from mobile devices according 
to the NIST guidelines for mobile devices (Ayers, Brothers, and Jansen, 2014). There was a passcode on the Android 
smartphone, but the passcode was entered prior to data acquisition. The forensics software established a connection with the 
device and the researchers made a physical and cloud acquisition of the device along with the attached storage, there was no 
SIM card. The forensic image was saved to an evidence file within the E3 case file. All the acquisition steps followed NIST 
mobile device guidelines. The evidence was parsed, and the researchers proceeded with forensic analysis.  
RESULTS 
The software calculated the total size and a hash value that would be used to verify the integrity of the image later. Figure 1 
displays the Google and Facebook accounts located by the cloud acquisition. The Google and Facebook credentials were cached 
on the device, which allowed the investigators access to the cloud data. The combination of the physical acquisition and cloud 
import yielded a 399-page document that displayed content from file system architecture to exact locations recorded by Google 
Location. The investigator was able to review text message details, call records, voicemails, alarm clock data, Bluetooth 
configuration, audio files, photos, installed applications (and associated application access), and some cached passwords. The 
physical acquisition portion revealed capabilities that could be compromising to those concerned with data security and privacy. 
Each of the applications revealed substantial data retention that could prompt security concerns among recurrent users. 
Regarding research question 1, the Google applications did store information such as contacts, text messages, photos, and 
searches on the local device, but the location tracking data was stored in the user’s cloud account as theorized by research 
question 2 in this study. Google Timeline was proven to store location tracking information in the cloud account for the 
smartphone in this experiment regardless of whether location services was enabled or disabled by the user. 
  
Figure 1. Cloud Acquisition displaying G-mail, Drive, Maps, and Facebook account 
Facebook 
A Facebook account was created on the smartphone to simulate user social interactions through posting, commenting, and 
chatting with other Facebook members. Following the two-week collection period, the researchers were able to retrieve every 
interaction that occurred on Facebook. The researchers could view detailed insight into profile attributes, posting times, and 
links to profiles of all users that had interactions with the Facebook account. Figure 2 details the associated file structure. Figure 
3 displays detailed user interactions through the Facebook mobile application. All the reported information was searchable and 
could be exported.  
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Google Application Suite 
A Google account was created on the Galaxy Note 5 device. The researchers sent and received e-mail that contained both text 
and images, created calendar events in Google Calendar, used Google Hangouts, created and edited files in Google Drive, and 
used Google Maps. Following the acquisition, details of every action were retrieved utilizing Paraben E3.  
    
Figure 2. Facebook file structure    Figure 3. Facebook detailed interactions 
 
Chat logs were aggregated from multiple accounts and services as shown in Figure 4. The chats were not explicitly saved to 
the device storage; instead they were captured from the cloud acquisition. Figure 5 shows that investigators were able to also 
uncover photos, pdfs, and other documents that were stored locally and in cloud accounts that had cached login credentials. 
Due to the cloud acquisition of the tested user account which yielded all conversations, user interactions, friend connections, 
etc., our findings for research question 4 indicate that Facebook does track and store all user interactions through their 
application.  
Every action taken on the phone had been logged, including location and was collected in the forensic analysis of this device. 
The Note 5 smartphone had location services turned on for the first half of the data logging period and turned off for the second 
half.  Regardless of whether the investigator was reviewing the enabled or disabled logging period, Google Timeline collected 
real-time location points throughout the entirety of the two-week process. Figure 6 illustrates how the Timeline information is 
parsed by the mobile forensic software. 
     
                                 Figure 4. All chat activities        Figure 5. Documents stored on device and cloud 
Research question 3 asked if location data was recorded when services were disabled by the user. In this study, the researcher 
did find that location was still recorded, regardless of the user disabling location services. The investigators could see when 
and where the tracking started and ended, addresses, GPS coordinates, distance traveled in each recorded segment, and even a 
link to Google Maps. One observation made through this data logging and analysis period was the inability for Google Location 
to pinpoint accurate location points on military installations. The test device traveled to Fort Gordon (Home of the U.S. Army 
Cyber Center) and location services pinged a nearby business but did not ping any location within the military installation. 
Further research could be observed regarding location tracking and signal blocking as it relates to military operations.  
 
Figure 6. Google Timeline tracking regardless of location services being on/off 
DISCUSSION 
The results of this study uncovered hidden Google Timeline tracking location on an Android device, regardless of location 
services being turned on or off. This discovery prompted the question of why this service was logging location and what other 
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stored data could be pulled from the mobile device. The results also showed a more in-depth tracking of chat logs and every 
activity through Facebook and aggregated across multiple accounts and the ease of accessing cloud accounts. The forensics 
analysis was supposed to find the information that it found, but the applications were not supposed to track and store every 
piece of data that was recovered. The results of these findings have implications relevant to every “smart” device user in the 
world. 
On December 11, 2018, Google’s CEO, Sundar Pichai, testified at a Congressional hearing regarding Google’s privacy policies 
amid concerns of consumer data collection. U.S. Congressman Bob Goodlatte provided opening statements with the comment, 
“Google is able to collect an amount of information about its users that would even make the NSA blush. Americans have no 
idea the sheer volume of information that is collected” (C-SPAN, 2018). 
On Tuesday, September 21, 2017, an article was released on Quartz that revealed Google’s use of Android location services to 
collect Android user locations, even when the location services option was disabled (Collins, 2017). The findings of this report 
were identical to the results yielded through the Google Location experimentation completed through this research. Following 
the announcement of the findings by Quartz, Google changed their user privacy policy to list “Your Location” as data they 
actively collect. Google also indicated that they track location services to more accurately tailor advertisements based on the 
user’s location history. By Wednesday, November 22, 2017, Google responded to Quartz and addressed the allegations by 
stating that they would end location tracking of users with disabled location services by the end of November. There was no 
comment made about ending user tracking and reporting for those with location services turned on. 
On August 13, 2018, the Associated Press released the results of their own investigation into Google’s location tracking through 
a series of tests performed with location history turned off (Nakashima, 2018). Their results were identical to that of this 
research which indicated continued location tracking even after Google’s 2017 announcement to cease location tracking on 
users with location settings disabled. Since the location tracking exposure in 2017, Google has restricted the controls of the 
easily accessible location history setting and redistributed micro-location attributes through hidden settings across numerous 
operating system level menus (Rash, 2018). The change from one central location setting to numerous nested location settings 
has allowed for Google’s continued location tracking without users being made aware of this variation in policy (Google 
Privacy, 2018). This action has prompted concern over Google’s compliance with the European General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) (GDPR, 2018). Congressman Ted Poe, from the U.S. House Judiciary Committee, was frustrated with 
Google’s C.E.O.’s lack of ability or transparency to answer if Google is tracking when his phone moves from one place to 
another. Sundar Pichai replied “not by default, but there may be a Google service which you’ve opted-in to use” (Wakabayashi 
& Kang, 2018).  Since May 25, 2018 the GDPR is in force. The act requires that consumers have the right to access and right 
to be forgotten. If Google’s location tracking is found to breach GDPR requirements, Google can be fined up to 4% of their 
annual global yield (Bridge, 2018). 
LIMITATIONS 
The study was conducted with a single Android Galaxy Note device with Google cloud application usage, picture/document 
storage, chat messaging. The device was rooted prior to being acquired and analyzed. Newer devices with enabled security 
protections may not yield the physical acquisition results that the researchers were able to obtain in this study.   
CONCLUSION 
At the time of examining this phone, Google and Facebook were not transparent regarding what data is tracked and how it is 
obtained. The findings of this study give users more information about what the device in their pocket is doing regardless of 
the settings that they believe they control. While data recording could benefit researchers and law enforcement, there is 
debate over what data should be collected by private entities. Google has made numerous updates to their privacy policies but 
only in response to consumers such as Quartz identifying location tracking inconsistencies and making these revelations 
public. These changes both in policy and software have made it more difficult for end users to understand and control what 
data is being collected. The most recent update to Google Timeline has made the application easily viewable and able to be 
corrected or deleted by the end user, while other parts that appear as if they were never tracked, are actually stored and 
accessible by professionals with expertise to perform forensic analysis on electronic devices. The implications regarding data 
storage by private companies without oversight is a serious concern for consumers that utilize these platforms. Regulations 
such as the GDPR assist in keeping companies honest about their data collection methods and how this stored data is 
manipulated in an effort to protect the privacy and security of consumers. As this research identified data privacy and security 
concerns related to application data storage, future iterations may focus on micro-location settings through Android OS, 
educating users of natively stored data, and how to ensure privacy in a technological age.  
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